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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHIO TOMINO, 
v. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
GREATER PARK CITY 
COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
14835 
Plaintiff, assignee of Development Services, 
Incorporated (hereinafter "Development Services" or herein-
after referred to as "Purchaser"), brought this action 
under a contract to recover certain funds previously paid 
to Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
During the course of the proceeding partial sum-
mary judgments were granted on certain issues and a non-
jury trial was conducted on September 8, 1976 before the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. resulting in 
a Memorandum 
Decision (R. 198-99), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (R. 202-07), and a Judgment (R. 208) · f in avor of Plain· 
tiff and against Defendant with judgment in the sum of 
$103,975.00 together with accrued interest. F/N 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant states that it seeks reversal of the 
judgment and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The operative facts relative to the transaction 
in question are not particularly in dispute. The parties 
stipulated (see R. 233 through 238) with respect to most 
of the operative facts and the admission of most of the 
operative documents. The pertinent facts, which are 
herein set forth in essentially the same order as they are 
found in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 
202, et seg.) are as follows: 
On the 7th day of February, 1974, Development 
Services, Inc., a Nebraska corporation (hereinafter called 
F /N In its discussion of "Disposition in Lower court" at .. 
p. 2 of its Brief, Defendant claims that its presentati 
of evidence at trial "was limited by the prior sununarv 
judgments". To the contrary, De~endant,. for re~so~~f'. 
unclear, offered evidence on subJects which Plaint7 t'' 
were precluded by the prior summary judgments, plain·· 
objected accordingly, but the trial court allowed the 
evidence in. (R. 244). 
-2-
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"Development"), and defendant executed a Purchase Agreement 
regarding certain real propery located in Park City, Utah. 
(See Exhibit 1-P, and R. 234) .F/N The contract provided 
in paragraph 26 as follows: 
"It is the intention of the parties 
that the Inn and all other facilities 
constructed by Purchaser upon the 
Subject Property will be operated 
pursuant to a franchise granted by 
Sheraton Inns, Inc., which shall 
identify the same as a Sheraton Inn 
or by a similar name and shall provide 
for reservation, supervisory and other 
services customary with Sheraton Inns, 
Inc. franchisees. Purchaser agrees 
that it will not commence construction 
upon the Subject Property unless and 
until such franchise or a comparable 
franchise is obtained and a copy of 
the franchise agreement is delivered 
to GPCC. The provisions of this 
Paragraph 26 shall not in any manner 
constitute a basis for delay by Pur-
chaser in making any payments or taking 
any action on or before the dates herein 
provided. In the event that such fran-
chise or a comparable franchise is not 
obtained prior to June 1, 1974, Purchaser 
shall have the right, upon written notice 
to GPCC given not later than June 15, 
1974, to reconvey the Subject Property to 
GPCC, in which event GPCC shall be obli-
gated, promptly following such termination, 
to refund to Purchaser all sums thereto-
fore paid by Purchaser to GPCC as purchase 
price for the Subject Property pursuant 
to Paragraph 2 hereof, less a sum equal 
to interest on said purchase price from 
the date hereof to the date of such termi-
nation at the prime commercial rate es-
tablished by Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 
from time to time during such period." 
F/N An amendment to the agreement was received as Exhibit 
2-P together with a stipulation that it amended only 
the property description. (R. 237). 
-':!-
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Prior to February 7, 1974, Development paid 
$5,000 to defendant as earnest money · · in connection with 
said agreement. On February 7, 1974, Development paid 
$25,000 to defendant. The amount of $75, 000 was paid by 
Development and accepted by defendant on March 7, 1974. 
(See stipulation at R. 234). 
Although the contract contemplated an original 
closing date of April 30, 1974, the parties negotiated 
concerning and agreed to an extension of time in which 
to close said contract until approximately mid-July, 1974. r 
An additional sum of $20,000 was paid by Development to 
defendant on or about May 17, 1974 as consideration for 
the agreement of extension. Although no formal writing 
was prepared between the parties to evidence this extension, 
there were writings between the parties, signed by both 
parties to be charged which, taken together, reflect the 
extension agreement and the terms thereof. (See Exhibit 
4-P, R. 269-272). 
F /N Defendant confesses ignorance as to the trial court's 
findings that the extension was until "approximately 
mid-July". (See F/N on p. 6 of Appellant's Brief~._ 
This finding is based upon Exhibit 4-P which spec1fl· 
cally mentions July on both the second an~ third pages 
and on the testimony of defendant's own witi:e~s, Mr. 
warren King who, being questioned about Exhibit 4-P, 
testified: 
"Obviously I saw this letter. I accepted 
the $20,000. He says, 'I feel by July 
we should have most of our financing 
taken care of.' The letter says, 'Alright, 
you can have until July to get it done.'" 
(R. 27). 
-4- d 
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As of June l, 1974, although Development had 
submitted substantial materials to Sheraton Inns.in order 
to facilitate a franchise being issued (R. 245, et seq., 
Exhibit 10-D), Development had not received a Sheraton 
Inn franchise. (Stipulation at R. 235). on June 13, 
1974 at 5:00 P.M., Development mailed to defendant a 
notice terminating the agreement pursuant to the provi-
sions of Paragraph 26 thereof. (Exhibit 5-P and R. 235). 
Said notice was timely under the contract and was received 
by defendant. (R. 235). 
On or about March 5, 1975, Development assigned 
its rights in and to said Purchase Agreement to plaintiff, 
notice of which assignment was duly given to defendant on 
or about March 17, 1975. (R. 236, Exhibit 6-P). 
No Notice of Default was sent by defendant to 
Development until approximately February 15, 1975, when a 
Notice of Default was sent by defendant to Development and 
which was received by Development. On or about March 26, 
1975, defendant sent and Development received a further 
letter indicating that the default specified in the February 
15th letter had not been cured. (See Exhibit 8-P and 9-P 
and stipulation at R. 236). 
-~-
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PROCEDURAL HANDLING OF THE MATTER BELOW 
Defendant complains ubiquitously in its Brief 
about the "piecemeal" handling of this case below and 
about the alleged failure of the courts below to accord 
it a proper opportunity to present facts and to enter 
upon discovery. In view of these statements, we deem it 
germane to spend more than the ordinary amount of time 
discussing the procedure below in its exact chronology: 
The Complaint was filed on April 3, 1975. (R. 
2) . An Appearance of Counsel and Acceptance of Service 
was duly filed by Mr. M. Scott Woodland on behalf of Van 
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy ( R. 8 and 9) and in due 
course an Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint 
was filed by Van Cott on behalf of Greater Park City 
Company under date of May 8, 1975. (R. 10, et~.). It 
will be noted (see R. 12) that the only affirmative defensi 
raised by Defendant was that Development had failed to act 
in good faith in obtaining the Sheraton Franchise and 
therefore was estopped from seeking refund of the payments 
they had made under the agreement. It will be further 
noted that copies of the contract were attached to the 
Answer of Defendant (R. 17, et seq.). 
The next procedural step was that Plaintiff file
0 
a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Partial SUJlllll: 
Judgment under date of June 9, 1975. (R. 47-48). 
-6-
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Although the Motion for Summary Judgment or 
Judgment on the Pleadings was originally noticed for 
June 12, 1975 (R. 49), it was continued several times 
until it was finally heard on October 9, 1975. (R. 50, 
R. 64, R. 77). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support 
of its motion (R. 51-60), and prior to the hearing date 
a Memorandum was filed on behalf of the Defendant by 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. (R. 65). Although 
no detailed evaluation of that Memorandum will be made at 
this juncture, reference will be made to it throughout 
the argument portion of this Brief to point out that a 
number of the arguments being raised on this appeal relative 
to that Motion for Summary Judgment were not raised below 
by Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. When the matter 
was finally heard on October 9, 1975, by Minute Entry 
(R. 78) and Order (R. 79-80), Judge Bryant H. Croft granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Promptly, there was a substitution of counsel on 
behalf of Defendant with van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy withdrawing and Frederick S. Prince of Prince, 
Yeates, ward & Geldzahler appearing. (This occurred on 
October 28, 1975 - R. 81). On the same date, new counsel 
for Defendant filed a Petition for Intermediate Appeal with 
this Court. (See generally this Court's Docket No. 14319 
which contains the Interlocutory Appeal and matters per-
taining thereto). Significantly, in the Petition for 
Intermediate Appeal filed by new counsel, they assert: 
-7-
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"The lower court's order involved 
defendant's substantial rights 
under the contract and will 
materially affect the final de-
cision in that the defense struck 
down by such order is the sole 
affirmative defense asserted by 
defendant and is determinitive of 
the question of liability of 
defendant to plaintiff, leaving 
only the amount of damages to be 
resolved by the court below." 
This Court denied the Petition for Interlocu~ry 
Appeal and, taking comfort in the admission by Defendant 
that the sole substantive issue in the case had been re-
solved, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sununary Judgment. 
(R. 82-83). Plaintiff cited in that motion, as previously 
conceded by Defendant, that the sole remaining issue was 
the amount of damages which was capable of mathematical 
resolution and Plaintiff submitted affidavits to support 
the necessary mathematical computations. (R. 84 through 
86) . 
An Order was appropriately issued finding the 
amount of damages but, pursuant to the request of Defendant 
authorizing Defendant to raise additional issues in the 
proceeding by way of amendment to be made within ten (10) 
days of the Order. (See Order of Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. 
at R. 111-112). 
Taking full advantage of this authorization, 
Defendant filed its Amended Answer under date of December 
8, 1975 setting forth numerous affirmative defenses never 
d · instances raised before by previous counsel an , in some 
Thl. rd Affi' rmative Defense at R. llSI (see particularly the 
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raising issues which were quite arguably precluded by 
the previous summary judgment - ~.,the Sheraton 
Franchise matter. Under its Amended Answer however, De-
fendant claimed that Plaintiff had in fact obtained a 
Sheraton Franchise and therefore that the provisions of 
paragraph 26 of the contract did not apply. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
that issue seeking to strike the Third Affirmative Defense 
and filed therewith supporting affidavits indicating that 
at no time did Development Services obtain a Sheraton 
Franchise. (See R. 122-124). Although this was originally 
noticed for May 21, 1976 (R. 125) it was continued from 
time to time until June 30, 1976 (see R. 129 through 135) 
for various reasons including "to allow defendant to file 
counter affidavits". (R. 133). Defendant did not file any 
counter affidavits and accordingly the motion was granted 
when heard on June 30, 1976. (See R. 135 and R. 150). 
Even though the Sheraton Franchise issue had 
therefore at that point been the subject of two definitive 
summary judgments - one by Judge Croft and the final by 
Judge Sawaya, and even though there was no remaining issue 
in the pleadings dealing with that issue, Defendant filed 
a notice to take the deposition of two employees of Sheraton 
Inns, Inc. - Irving Zeldman and James Wellbeloved. (R. 144). 
Since the issues had been completely resolved by summary 
judgment, Plaintiff, properly we submit, filed a Motion for 
-9-
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Protective Order seeking to terminate these scheduled 
depositions. (R. 136-137). The protective order matter 
was heard by Marcellus K. Snow who, after argument, 
entered his Order under date of July 14, 1976 to the 
effect that: 
"The plaintiff's Motion for 
Protective Order should be and 
the same hereby is granted, it 
being the opinion of the court 
that the Sheraton Inn Franchise 
issue is no longer a relevant 
issue in this proceeding in view 
of the prior orders of Judge 
Croft and Judge Sawaya." (R. 154). 
Undaunted by Judge Snow's Order, counsel for 
Defendant tried yet again to seek the discovery which 
had been prohibited by the Court's Protective Order -
on August 3, 1976 it filed a Notice of Deposition upon 
Written Questions of James Wellbeloved of Sheraton Inns, 
Inc. (R. 158). 
Since it seemed the matter had been adequately 
handled by the Court at that time, Plaintiff did file 
another Motion for Protective Order and Sanctions. (R. 
181-183) • As part of the material set forth in that 
motion, Plaintiff stated: 
"The attempt by defendant to 
undertake discovery which has 
previously been rejected by 
this court constitutes an effort 
which is not in good faith, 
which violates the letter and 
spirit of Rule 11, and which 
is tantamount to contempt of 
Judge Snow's prior order. It 
is respectfully submitted that 
-10- d 
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th~s behavior is sufficiently 
g~ievous to warrant the imposi-
tion of sanctions against de-
fendant in such mode as the 
court may deem appropriate." 
(Tr. 183). 
The Motion for Protective Order was granted and 
the Court imposed sanctions in the sum of $100 attorney's 
fees against Defendant "based upon Defendant's attempt to 
circumvent the protective order of this court as heretofore 
made and entered on the 14th day of July, 1976". (R. 189-
190). 
Lest it be assumed that Defendant's persistence 
in this matter became weakened by the several summary 
judgments, the two protective orders, and the imposition 
of sanctions for deliberate attempts to violate previous 
orders, at trial, counsel started promptly again attempting 
to interject the Sheraton Inn Franchise issue which had been 
buried, indeed cremated, by the preceding orders of Judge 
Croft, Judge Hanson, Sr., Judge Sawaya, and Judge Snow. 
(R. 244 through 255). This entire line of questioning, 
over repeated objections by Plaintiff's counsel, dealt 
with the Sheraton Inn Franchise issue or various facets of 
it. As noted above, the Court ultimately entered its 
Findings and conclusions and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 
Since defense counsel insisted on introducing 
evidence, over objection, relative to Mr. Lowe's efforts 
on behalf of Development to obtain the Sheraton Franchise, 
the Court made a finding with respect to this matter which 
is set forth in the Findings of Fact No. 11: 
-11-
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"The court finds in this connection 
tha~ De~elopment did exercise good 
faith in pursuing the Sheraton Inn 
Franchise and took the indicated 
necessary steps toward receiving 
the franc~ise including the payment 
of a portion of the franchise fee 
the submission of extensive feasi~ 
bility and market studies and the 
sending of other document~tion to 
the Sheraton Inn organization." 
There is clearly evidence in the record to support this 
finding (R. 243, ~ seg.) which was introduced in evidenc, 
over Plaintiff's objection, and which defense counsel de· 
sired to place in evidence rather than relying on his hope 
for reversal of Judge Croft's Order through the Proffer of 
Proof also submitted. 
The trial court made numerous findings relative 
to the rights of the parties. Specifically, the Court 
found that at the time Development exercised its right to 
seek refund of its monies under the contract, it was not 
in default of the provisions of the contract. (Tr. 205 • 
Finding No. 12). It further found that in all respects 
"Development duly and properly exercised its rights under 
paragraph 26 of the contract, under circumstances in which 
it had the right to do so, and it was therefore entitled 
to a refund of all sums theretofore paid by Defendant to 
Greater Park City Company" less interest at the Chase 
Manhattan rate as previously indicated. The Court speci· 
fically found that the Defendant's "fraud defense" was 
groundless. 
. n (See Finding No. 10 at Tr. 204 and Conclusio 
-12- « 
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No. 3 at Tr. 206). 
Finally, the Court made findings to the effect 
that the retention by Defendant of $125,000, as it claims, 
would constitute "an unconscionable forfeiture or penalty". 
(Tr. 206). 
-13-
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POINT I 
JUDGE CROFT DID NOT ERR IN 
ISSUING THE PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Point I of Appellant's Brief is comprised of 
an amalgamation. of attacks against the Sununary Judgment 
issued by Judge Croft on October 10, 1975. (R. 79-80). 
A substantial number of the arguments raised in Point I 
are illustrative of a recurrent theme in this appeal -
-counsel for Defendant, not having represented Defendant 
at the time of Judge Croft's Sununary Judgment, are seekin1 
to raise issues for the first time on appeal in hopes 
of relitigating, virtually de ~· issues previously 
handled by other counsel who, in their own judgment, eitht 
neglected or did not feel it appropriate to raise the 
issues now raised. This effort at "Monday morning quarter 
backing" runs clearly contrary to the numerous decisions 
of this Court which hold that an issue, to be pressed on 
appeal, must have been raised below. F/N 
An example of Defendant's de nova approach to 
this appeal is the procedural argument found on p. 14 of 
F/N see, ~· Meyer v. DeLuke, 23 Utah 2d 74'. 457 
P.2d 966 (1969) ("A Pc;>int neither ra~sed in.theilv 
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial ordinar 1· 
cannot be considered for the first time on appe~ · 
In the Matter of the Estate of Akker, 19 U~ah 2b~ 
414 432 p 2d 45 (1967) ("Neither of the fir7t., 
, . 1 d . put in is .. points were raised in the p ea ings nor . ed fc: 
at trial. Therefore, they cannot be consider 
the first time on this appeal.") 
-14-
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its Brief, i.e., a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
is not proper until the pleadings are closed. At no 
time did counsel's predecessor raise this issue before 
Judge Croft. F/N 
In all events, even if the issue were properly 
here, it is a red herring rather than an issue inasmuch as 
the motion was not granted as a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings but rather was granted as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (See the Minute Entry at R. 78) . It is clear 
that a Motion for Summary Judgment is timely filed and 
appropriate "at any time after the expiration of twenty 
(20) days from the conunencement of the action". Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(a). 
Defendant goes on, at p. 15 of its Brief, to 
create another straw man by taking the position that the 
Motion for Summary Judgment (properly a Motion for Summary 
Judgment since the contract was, as a matter of evidence, 
before the Court) must be treated as a Motion to Dismiss 
and proceeding, thereafter, to point out why a Motion to 
Dismiss should not have been granted. This argument was 
~raised below by counsel's predecessor in interest 
and, moreover, it is totally spurious. 
F/N It is difficult, of course, to support a negative 
by reference to the record. However, the Brief 
filed by van Cott, Bagley, on behalf of Defendant 
(R. 65-75) is a good indicator of what the real 
issues were at the time of the argument on summary 
judgment. 
-15-
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To set the procedural record straight on this 
motion, and to demonstrate that Defendant's frequent 
allusions to lack of due process are groundless, it 
should be noted that the Motion for Summary Judgment in 
question was filed under date of June 9, 1975. (R. 4?). 
It was originally noticed up for June 12, 1975 (R. 49) 
but continued several times (R. 50, R. 76, R. 77) until 
it was finally heard on October 9, 1975. (R. 78). There· 
fore counsel for Defendant had four months in which to 
raise any issue they wanted to raise, in which to file 
affidavits, in which to submit memoranda (which they did 
(R. 65-75)) or to raise any questions they desired. Nm 
being dissatisfied with the previous handling of the case 
and with the benefit of "20-20 hindsight", counsel seekst: 
raise newborn issues, de ~, on this appeal. 
Much the same is true of counsel's extensive 
argument regarding the parole evidence rule and integra-
tion problems conunencing at p. 16 of its Brief. This iss~' 
simply was not raised below. Both parties went forward 
on the motion full-well knowing that the only evidence 
before the Court was the written contract itself. Defenda: 
did not raise the question of integration nor the question 
of extrinsic evidence. Nor did it attempt to place ex-
trinsic evidence in the record, which it could have done 
h h . h . t h d The parties by affidavit in the four mont s w ic 1 a · 
t d the motion clearly recognized that the issue presen e on 
was one which could be resolved by the contract itself 
-16- • 
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and without the need for additional evidence. A Motion 
for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 t pu s a burden on the 
opposing party to present evidence of issues he desires 
to raise. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 
(1960). 
There is a strong corollary between the instant 
case and Mastic Tile Division of Rubberoid co. v. Acme 
Distributing Co., 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964). 
As noted by the Court: 
"Both sides laid the matter in 
the lap of the court by their 
mutual motions, and under the 
facts of this particular case 
unequivocally invited and 
authorized the court to decide 
the case by interpreting the 
documents. This the court did. 
Having done so in a case like 
this, where interpretation of 
the writings was the only issue, 
we do not think the court should 
be required to submit to the 
subsequent urging of the loser 
that although he took his chances 
without reservation, he must have 
another go at the case, - although 
it is conceivable that in some 
other and unusual case this might 
be so." 
Of course the instant case does not involve cross-motions 
for summary judgment, but it just as clearly involves a 
situation where the parties knowingly submitted the case 
with the only factual matter before the Court being the 
document itself. Having done so, Defendant is now pre-
cluded from seeking to inject extrinsic evidence into the 
interpretation or effect of the document. 
-17-
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After exhausting its procedural bag of tricks, 
Defendant finally does get to the merits of Judge Croft's 
Order commencing at p. 22 of its Brief. This is a ques-
tion which was raised properly below and to which we wil1 
be happy to respond. 
Before embarking upon an analysis of the case 
law, however, it is appropriate to analyze some distinctive 
elements of the contract in question. Paragraph 26, quote: 
hereinabove, contains the following language (which is 
emphasized for purposes of aiding in the following argument 
language. 
"In the event that such franchise 
[a Sheraton Franchise] or a com-
parable franchise is not obtained 
prior to June l, 1974 purchaser 
shall have the right, upon written 
notice to GPCC given not later than 
June 15, 1974, to reconvey the 
subject property to GPCC, in which 
event GPCC shall be obligated, 
promptly following such termination, 
to refund to purchaser all sums 
theretofore paid by purchaser to 
GPCC as purchase price for the sub-
ject property pursuant to para~raph 
2 hereof, less a sum equal to in-
terest on said purchase price from 
the date hereof to the date of such 
termination at the prime commercial 
rate established by Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A., from time to time durin~ 
such period." (R. 32-33). (Emphasis 
added). 
are fai. rly self-evi· dent from this Certain things 
First, there is nothing in the language itself 
any Obli. gation on the part of the purchaser which creates 
to obtain the Sheraton Franchise. Paraqraph 26, should, 
-18- d 
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in this respect, be read in contradistinction to other 
provisions in the contract wherein various third party 
actions are made conditions of the contractual commitments. 
See for example paragraph 8 (commencing at R. 23) dealing 
with building permits. That provision also provides for 
a reconveyance in the event that the building permits are 
not obtained, but note the language which clearly makes it 
obligatory upon purchaser to do certain things in this 
connection: 
"GPCC agrees that, in the event 
the prior to June 1, 1974 purchaser 
shall make all necessary applications 
and take all action necessary to 
obtain a building permit • • • and 
shall diligently pursue efforts~ 
obtain such permits, and, in the event 
that any of such permits are not ob-
tained prior to June 1, 1974, purchaser 
shall have a right upon written notice 
to GPCC given not later than June 15, 
1974, to reconvey the subject property. 
(Emphasis added). 
n 
Also interestingly enough, in the event that the building 
permits are not obtained following the diligent pursuit 
thereof by purchaser, it should be noted that GPCC is obli-
gated to refund all of the purchase price rather than all 
of the purchase price less interest at the Chase Manhattan 
rate, as is the case under paragraph 26. 
This comparison between paragraphs 26 and 8 leaves 
one to the obvious conclusion that, had the parties desired 
to include some affirmative obligation on the part of the 
purchaser to use diligence in obtaining a Sheraton Fran-
chise they certainly knew the language with which to 
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accomplish this result - they could merely have used the 
same type of language - ~.,due diligence, etc._ as 
used in paragraph 8. Th t th d'd d a ey i not o so lends very 
substantial credence to the interpretation of the contract 
urged by the Plaintiff. 
A second factor which needs to be emphasized in 
comparing the instant case with many of those cited by 
Defendant is the fact that the failure to obtain the 
Sheraton Franchise does not result in the contract becornir.: 
a mere nullity or a "bare option". Rather, unlike paragra: 
8 for example, paragraph 26 specifically provides that if 
the Sheraton Franchise is not obtained, and if reconveyance 
is sought by the purchaser, the purchaser is required to 
pay interest on the full purchase price for the period frc: 
the date of the contract to the date of termination. Note 
that the full purchase price in this case is $630, 000.00. 
Interest on it from the date of contract to the date of 
termination is not some mere trifling deposit but rather 
the sum of $21,024.99. (See Tr. 84-85). So we do not have 
a situation where by reconveyance the purchaser converts thi 
contract to a mere nullity or an illusory contract. Rathe: 
in the instant case we have a unique situation where the 
purchaser in effect has two ways in which he may perform t: 
contract: (a) he may obtain a Sheraton Franchise and proc: 
with the matter, or (b) if the Sheraton Franchise is n~ 
obtained he may pay interest on the entire purchase price 
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for several months and rel' h' ieve imself of further obliga-
tions. 
Bearing these critical distinctions in mind, we 
turn now to an analysis of the cases cited by Defendant. 
Defendant relies heavily upon the case of Stabile v. McCarthy, 
336 Mass. Repts. 339, 145 N.E.2d 821 (1957). (See Ap-
pellant's Brief at Tr. 23, et seq.). A close look at 
Stabile demonstrates immediately that it is fundamentally 
distinguishable from the instant case. For example, the 
contract language in Stabile provided: 
"This agreement is subject to the 
right of the buyer in the event 
that he shall have been unable 
to obtain the approval of the 
Wilmington Planning Board of the 
proposed subdivision date of the 
• • • premises prior to the date 
. • . set for performance • . • 
at his option to cancel this 
agreement and claim the return 
of his deposit, in which event 
this agreement shall terminate 
without further obligation on the 
part of either party • . •. " (Emphasis added). 
Immediately two distinctions are evident. First, the con-
tract speaks in obligatory language. In fact, the Court 
in quoting from the contract and discussing the obligation 
by the purchaser to obtain the permit itself stressed the 
word "unable" in its analysis. (See 145 N.E.2d 821 at 823). 
A second critical distinction, is that in Stabile, unlike 
the instant case, the failure to obtain the building permit 
constituted a complete washout of the contract with the 
total deposit being returned to the purchaser - this is 
highly distinguishable from the situation as present wherein 
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the purchaser is able to retain interest on the entire 
purchase price for the period in question. r 
n one case, 
Stabile, the contract becomes a nullity, whereas in the 
instant case the contract merely is performed in an al-
ternative manner. Finally, a point which in all candor 
should have been brought out by the Defendant itself in 
citing this case is that there was really no dispute in 
the case about the Plaintiff having an affirmative obliga-
tion to obtain the Planning Board approval. The Court 
itself observes this as follows: 
"The plaintiff in his brief in 
effect concedes that he was 
bound to use reasonable efforts 
to obtain Planning Board approval." 
(145 N.E.2d 821 at 823). 
This being the case, the only issue before the Court in 
Stabile is whether, in fact, he had used such reasonable 
efforts. 
The case of Lyon v. Giannoni, 16 8 Cal. App. 2d 
336, 335 P.2d 690 (1959) discussed at pp. 26 and 27 of 
Appellant's Brief is likewise quite distinguishable. In 
that case like Stabile, but unlike the instant case, the 
interpretation of the contract would have required that 
the total deposit be returned in the event the condition 
precedent was not satisfied. The Court merely held that 
the right to have the water tested by a reliable pump 
company, given to the purchaser by the contract, did not 
make the contract a mere option or a nullity. We com-
pletely agree with that interpretation and do not urge 
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otherwise in the instant case. We are not claiming that 
the contract should be a mere option or a nullity - those 
are words chosen by the Defendant in an attempt to im-
properly characterize the case. Our contention merely is 
that the purchaser in the instant contract had available 
alternative means of performing the contract, either of 
which requires valuable consideration to flow to the seller. 
He may pursue either of those courses without being in 
default of the contract. 
Nor is this a case where the purchaser is seeking 
to avoid liability by refusing to perform a condition 
precedent (as argued at pp. 28 and 29 of Appellant's Brief). 
Appellant has conveniently ignored the entire concept of 
alternative performance even though that was stressed and 
argued extensively before Judge Croft at the time the 
motion was originally heard. 
Some fundamental distinctions, critical to the 
type of contract here in question, have apparently alluded 
the Defendant. It is perfectly permissible for a contract 
to call for alternative performance - i.e., the promiser 
may fulfill the contract by fulfilling either of two 
alternatives. This was early recognized by this Court in 
Bradbury v. Fillingame, 84 Utah 178, 35 P.2d 772 (1934). 
See also Restatement of Contracts, §325; Corbin on Contracts, 
§1079 (1964). In the instant case, under paragraph 26 as 
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it is written, the purchaser may fulfill the contract 
in one of two ways - he may obtain the Sheraton Franchise 
and proceed with the contract or he may, alternatively, 
not obtain the Sheraton Franchise, reconvey the propert y, 
and pay interest on the total purchase price for the perioo 
from the date of the contract to the period of terminati' on. 
The question, of course, arises as to whether 
the contract is truly one for alternative performance or 
rather is one which has performance on the one hand and 
a provision for liquidated damages on the other - such a 
contract would not be one for alternative performance since 
failure to perform the main obligation is a default or 
breach of the contract which then triggers the liquidated 
damages provision. Each contract, of course, must be 
analyzed under its own tenns to determine which of these 
two types of contracts really exist. In the instant case, 
the answer seems rather evident - that is it seems clear 
that the parties did not consider that the failure to ob· 
tain a Sheraton Franchise and the corollary payment of 
interest on the total purchase price was to be a default 
of the contract. This is quite clear from an analysis and 
comparison between paragraphs 25 and 26 of the contract (R. 
30, et seq.). Paragraph 25 deals, in orthodox terms, with 
occasions of default. Note, for example, that under para· 
graph 25(a) after 
and after failure 
giving notice of default and the like 
to cure the default within thirty ( 30) 
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days the seller has a variety of options available including 
the right under paragraph 25{a) of retaining all funds paid 
as liquidated damages. Note that this paragraph is intended 
to cover all defaults. However, it obviously does not 
apply to the failure to obtain a Sheraton Franchise since 
that is dealt with expressly in paragraph 26 in another 
manner. Under paragraph 26 if the Sheraton Franchise is 
not obtained, purchaser is given the "right" to terminate 
and the vendor has the "obligation" to refund purchaser all 
sums theretofore paid less Chase Manhattan interest on the 
entire purchase price. If it was considered by the parties 
that the failure to obtain a Sheraton Franchise was in fact 
a default under the contract, rather than merely an alterna-
tive performance under the contract, there would be no 
reason for this language since the default provisions of 
paragraph 25 could have applied. Rather than allowing those 
provisions to apply, the parties dealt specifically with 
this issue and provided a method for handling the situation 
in which the She~aton Franchise was not obtained. Further 
support for this analysis may be found in the absence of 
any language which refers to the Chase Manhattan interest as 
being liquidated damages or the like. Rather, it is in 
effect rental for the property during the period in question, 
which is uniquely intended to compensate the vendor for any 
inconvenience he may have suffered. 
Corbin, in his work on contracts, has recognized 
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the fundamental distinction which we seek t o make here. 
In Section 1082 of his work he notes: 
"It is evident that some alternative 
contracts giving the power of choice 
between the alternatives to the 
promiser can easily be confused with 
contracts that provide for the pay-
ment of liquidated damages in the 
case of breach, provided that one of 
the alternatives is the payment of 
a sum of money. Certain important 
differences between these two kinds 
of contracts, however, have been 
indicated above. There is no chance 
of such confusion in the case of an 
alternative contract where neither 
alternative performance is the payment 
of a sum of money. If, upon a proper 
interpretation of the contract, it is 
found that the parties have agreed 
that either one of the two alternative 
performances is to be given by the 
promiser and received by the promisee 
as the agreed exchange and equivalent 
for the return performance rendered 
by the promisee, the contract is a 
true alternative contract. This is 
true even though one of the alterna-
tive performances is the payment of a 
liquidated sum of money; that fact does 
not make the contract one for rendering 
of a single performance with the pro-
vision for liquidated damages in case of 
breach. n 
Corbin quotes extensively from the case of Pearson v. 
Williams, 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 244 (1840). We quote Corbin's 
footnote as follows: 
"In Pearson v. Williams, 24 Wend. 
(N.Y.) 244 (1840), the plaintiff 
conveyed land to the defendant, 
receiving in part payment $21,0?0 
in cash, the defendant covenanting 
further that he would erect two 
brick houses on the land by a cer-
tain date or, in default of erecting 
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the houses by that date, he would pay 
to the plaintiff the sum of $4,000 or 
more. The defendant failed to erect 
the houses, and the plaintiff recovered 
judgment for $4,000. The court said· 
'This does not belong to the class of 
cases in which the question of liquidated 
damages has usually arisen . • • Here 
there is no absolute engagement to build 
the houses. It was optional with the 
defendant whether he would build them or 
not; and there would have been no suf-
ficient breach if the plaintiffs had 
stopped with alleging that the houses were 
not built. This is not a covenant to 
build, with a liquidation of the damages 
in case of nonperformance; but it is a 
covenant to build within a specified time 
or afterwards to pay a sum of money. The 
money is not to be paid by way of damages 
for not building the houses; but it is 
to be paid if the houses are not built 
as part of the contract price for the 
lots conveyed by the intestate. Again, 
this is not simply an alternative covenant 
to build or to pay a sum of money within a 
specified period. If it were so, the 
question of damages would perhaps be open; 
but it is an agreement to build by a certain 
day or afterwards pay a sum of money. When 
the day for building had gone by, it was 
then merely a covenant to pay money. It 
was necessary in declaring, to allege that 
the houses were not built--not, however, be-
cause that part of the contract was any 
longer in force--but by way of showing that 
the event had happened upon which the de-
fendant agreed to pay the money. It had 
now become a simple covenant to pay money; 
and like other cases where there is an 
agreement to pay a gross sum of money; that 
sum with interest from the time it became 
I H payable, forms the measure of damages. 
In conclusion, the contract which is the subject 
of the instant action was one which obviously was negotia-
ted between the parties in some detail. To sustain the 
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Defendant's contention with respect to that contract 
requires the Court to rewrite it in a way t · no originally 
done by the parties themselves and to add terms which 
they did not themselves feel appropriate to paragraph 26. 
(Even though, as noted above, they knew how to accomplis: 
that result had they so desired - see for example paragrai 
8 of the contract) • This Court has frequently held that 
it is its duty to enforce contracts as written not as 
rewritten judicially. In Ephriam Theatre v. Hawk, 7 Utah 
2d 163, 166, 321 P.2d 221 (1958) this Court noted: 
"In considering the controversy 
here it is well to keep in mind 
the fundamental concepts in regard 
to contracts: that their purpose 
is to reduce to writing the condi-
tions upon which the minds of the 
parties-have met and to fix their 
rights and duties in respect thereto. 
The intent so expressed is to be 
found, if possible, within the four 
corners of the instrument itself in 
accordance with the ordinarv accepted 
meaninq of the words used. Unless 
there is ambiquitv or uncertainty 
in the lanquaqe so that the meaninq 
is confused, or is susceptible of 
more than one meaninq, there is no 
justification for interpretation 
or explanation from extraneous sources. 
• • • Generally speaking, neither ~f 
the parties nor the cour~ ~as any.right 
to ignore or modify conditions which 
are clearly expressed merely because 
it may subject one of the parties to 
hardship . " 
see also numerous other decisions to the same general 
effect. 29 Utah 2d Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 
212, 507 P.2d 381 (1973); Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 
-28- s4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972); Skousen v. Smith, 27 
Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972). 
In a very recent decision, Woodland Theatres, Inc. 
v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700 (Utah, 1977), 
this Court has dealt expressly with a similar problem wherein 
one of the parties sought to impose implied conditions in a 
lease contract. This Court quoted with approval from Percoff 
v. Solomon, 259 Ala. 482, 67 So. 2d 21 (1953) as follows: 
"An implied covenant must rest 
entirely on the presumed intention 
of the parties as gathered from 
the terms as actually expressed 
in the written instrument itself, 
and it must appear that it was so 
clearly within the contemplation 
of the parties that they deemed it 
unnecessary to express it, and 
therefore omitted to do so; or it 
must appear that it is necessary 
to infer such a covenant in order 
to effectuate the full purpose of 
the contract as a whole as gathered 
from the written instrument. It 
is not enough to say that an implied 
covenant is necessary in order to 
make the contract fair, or that 
without such a covenant it would 
be improvident or unwise, or that 
the contract would operate unjustly. 
It must arise from the presumed in-
tention of the parties as gathered 
from the instrument as a whole." 
The interpretation urged by Defendant is improper 
and the partial summary judgment granted by Judge Croft should 
be sustained. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING REGARDING 
THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIMED FORFEITURE WAS PROPER AND IS 
DISPOSITIVE. 
In Point II of its Brief, Appellant complains of 
the trial court's ruling regarding the unconscionability 
of the forfeiture here sought to be retained by Defendant. 
Naturally, it only becomes necessary to involve 
oneself in this analysis if one finds that the Plaintiff 
has breached the contract - a finding not made by the 
trial court below and not, we submit, otherwise appropriate. 
Assuming arguendo such a breach is found or assuming this 
Court determines there was error in the construction of 
the contract relative to the breach or non-breach thereof, 
we nonetheless submit that Judge Hanson's finding re-
garding the unconscionable penalty is dispositive of this 
case and was entirely appropriate. 
Defendant's first complaint is that the finding 
was unnecessary and therefore should simply be disregarded. 
We completely disagree. It is entirely appropriate for ~y 
Court in issuing its decision to give alternative reasons 
justifying its decision. This is commonly practiced in both 
t and Cannot be condemned - indeed, trial and appellate cour s 
to do so would result in a massively awkward method of 
handling · d' · 1 d' t F/N JU icia ispu es. 
F/N . 1 c 21 Ut~ see, ~·, Santi v. Denver & R. G. West Re · o.,. fie' 
2d 157 442 p. 2d 921 (1968) (after finding no v~lid 0 · 
and ac~eptance, this court went on further to di~cu~r 11 
the Statute of Frauds). See also Engstrc;>m v .. Bus n~~ade 
Utah 2d 250, 436 P.2d 806 (1968), wherein this Co~r~onsti 
finding that a claimed retention of payments "'."ou~ecision· 
a penalty even though not necessary to the main rl! 
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Defendant further makes broad assertions that 
there are no facts in the record from which this determi-
nation could have been made, and yet the facts are present, 
glaring, and totally persuasive. The known facts, which are 
comparable to the facts which have been available to this 
court in numerous decisions regarding forfeitures, are as 
follows: 
(1) The contractually specified purchase price 
was $630,000.00. 
(2) The contract was entered into under date of 
February 7, 1974 and was terminated on June 13, 1974 - an 
elaosed time of somethina over four months. 
(3) Interest on the ourchase orice for four 
months at Chase's rate of interest is the sum of $21,024.99. 
(See Tr. 84-85). 
(4) The amount of the forefeiture beina claimed 
bv Defendant to be aoorooriate is the sum of $125,000.00. 
which is the total of the sums oaid orecedina. at the time 
of, and subseauent to the actual execution of the contract. 
In addition. Defendant had the use of this money interest-free 
for three to four months. 
(5) Plaintiff was never given possession of the 
property. 
(6) Plaintiff was never given a deed to the pro-
perty. 
(7) Plaintiff in no way entered upon the propery 
or depreciated it in any sense. 
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So what we have in this case is a · situation whe: 
the total inconvenience to the Defendant has been the 
fact that for a period of about four months its property wa; 
"tied up" by a potential purchaser who neither occupied nor 
built upon the ground. The actual amount being paid by 
Plaintiff exceeds the Chase interest of $21,000.00 - it~~ 
includes interest on the funds paid during the period that 
they were retained by Defendant, interest-free. 
The damages sought of $125,000.00 are grossly 
disproportionate to any conceivable harm that could have 
befallen or could have been predicted to befall the Defendant 
during the very short period from February 7th to June 1st 
of 1974. 
Even if Plaintiff had possessed the property to 
the exclusion of Defendant during the period in question, 
the most logical determination of actual damages to the 
Defendant would be rental value which is, at least roughly, 
equivalent to the very interest which it has received. The 
Court below needed no further facts to make the finding and, 
indeed, this Court by reviewing the same facts can just as 
clearly recognize that to allow Defendant to retain 
$125,000.00 for, in effect, having its property "tied up" 
for a four month period as against a total purchase price 
of $630,000.00 is unconscionable. $125,000.00 is fully 20% 
$ 630 00 0 00 If O ne annuaHze: of the total purchase price of , . · 
the return that Defendant would thereby receive, it will be 
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noted that at this rate of return Defendant receives a 
79% annual return on his purchase price - clearly a figure 
which shocks the conscience. 
The Supreme Court of Utah was among the first in 
this country to recognize the harshness of forfeiture pro-
visions such as those contained in paragraph 25 of the instant 
contract. F/N 
Probably because of the common use of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract in Utah, there are literally dozens of 
decisions of this Court dealing with the subject. In more 
modern times, perhaps Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 
P.2d 446 (1952) is the controlling precedent. The pertinent 
facts in Perkins v. Spencer are not far off from those pre-
sented in the instant case - the purchase price involved was 
$10,500.00 of which the purchaser had paid a total of 
$2,725.00 when he defaulted. This Court concluded that this 
was an unenforceable penalty and sent the matter back down 
for determination of actual damages. The relative relationships 
of the figures and the time in question are comparable to the 
instant case, although in the instant case there was not in 
fact occupancy of the premises - a quite significant distinction. 
Another case with some factual similarities is Engstrom v. 
Bushnell, 20 Utah 2d 250, 436 P.2d 806 (1968), wherein the 
F/N For an excellent historical discussion with partic~lar . 
emphasis on the Utah contribution to the case law in this 
area, arising from the seminal decision of M~lmberi v. 
Baugh 62 Utah 331 218 Pac. 975 (1923) see Forfeitures 
Under' Real Estate Installment Contracts in Utah", Vol. 
Utah Law Review 30 (19 ). 
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Court noted that the retention of $16,000.00 against 
a total 
purchase price of $58, 000. 00 would in effect be an uncon-
scionable penalty. 
It is difficult to determine some t exac scientif: 
ratio by which the Courts determine whether a particular s~ 
in a particular case constitutes a valid provision for liqui-
dated damages or an unconscionable penalty. The cases are 
replete with references to "equity" and "the conscience of 
the court". We conclude from this that the decision is 
essentially an equitable one in which the Court should con-
sider the various relevant circumstances and come to what ma: 
well be a visceral and yet equitable reaction on an ad hoc 
basis. Certainly, any attempt to set down a precise formula 
would run afoul of the next more complicated factual situatk 
In the present case, however, we respectfully submit that the 
facts are so extremely clear and the damages so completely 
unconscionable that reasonable minds could not seriously dif 
on the result and that, in all events, normal deference shou:: 
be given to the trial court's holding. Indeed, the instant 
case is substantially more appealing than many of those in 
which this Court has found forfeitures. The conduct of 
Development Services cannot be castigated as being wanton or 
malicious in any respect - indeed they spent very substantial 
funds in an attempt to comply with the provisions of the con· 
tracts, including not only the funds paid directly to Greater 
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Park City Company but also those funds expended for feasi-
bility studies, etc. At no time did they take possession 
of the property or depreciate it in any sense. The time 
period was extremely short - slightly over four months. 
Under Plaintiff's interpretation of this case, 
the provisions of paragraph 26 which call for Chase brass 
interest on the total purchase price ($21,000.00) is cer-
tainly a sufficient and reasonable award to Defendant for 
any damages it could conceivably suffer. For Defendant to 
now demand complete forfeiture of the entire $125,000.00, 
in fact, supports Plaintiff's contentions made in Point I 
of this Brief that there has in fact been no default. 
This is so because Defendant is urging an interpretation of 
the contract which is wholly inequitable. This Court has 
previously noted that "it is further pertinent to observe 
here that where there is a choice, an interpretation which 
will bring about an equitable result will be preferred over 
a harsh or inequitable one." .F/N 
F/N Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 
1007 (1972). 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A.Jl.1PLE OPPORTUNITIES 
TO PRESENT ITS CASE AND WAS ACCORDED 
COMPLETE DUE PROCESS 
Point III of Appellant's Brief seeks again to 
criticize the lower courts for failing to accord Defendant 
a full opportunity to present facts. We have already dealt 
with this issue extensively in the factual portion of this 
Brief (see particularly pp. 6 through 12, supra), and 
therefore we shall not respond at great length again. 
Counsel currently representing Defendant perhaps 
do not have the same total perspective of this case as 
Plaintiff's counsel do, inasmuch as Defendant's current 
counsel were brought in anew after the critical decision of 
Judge Croft. Looking at the case as a whole, however, and 
not merely at the portion of the case in which current counse. 
has been involved, it is quite apparent that the Defendant 
has been given its full day in court not once but indeed 
several times. The Motion for Summary Judgment originally 
filed specifically dealt with the Sheraton Franchise issue. 
(See R. 4 7-48). Counsel for Defendant had fully four months 
in which to take depositions, file affidavits, or submit any 
evidence desired to be considered by the Court in making its 
decision. That evidence, indeed, could have included the 
types of things proffered as evidence by Defendant's new 
h · d · Defendant did not counsel at the trial of t is procee ing. 
present such affidavits nor did it seek to continue the motior 
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claiminq that affidavits were unavailable as they could have 
done under Rule 56{f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather 
they knowingly and willingly participated in arguments on 
the Motion for Summary Judqment when the only matter in the 
file evidentiarilv was the contract itself. They should not 
be allowed the opportunity, now, of relitigating issues that 
should properly have been submitted at that juncture. 
Much the same thing is true of the subsequent 
summary judgment entered by Judge Sawaya. It too was con-
tinued for several weeks before finally being heard, and 
among the stated reasons for those continuances was to allow 
Defendant to obtain affidavits, which they did not do. 
It seems to us that Defendant has been given 
every opportunity to properly present its case but has failed 
to do so. Indeed they were given a unique opportunity, fol-
lowinq the initial decision of Judge Croft, to amend their 
Answer and raise additional defenses. 
Perhaps the most astounding development in this 
whole sequence of events was at the trial itself. Defendant, 
having been told repeatedly that the Sheraton Franchise issue 
was totally resolved, proceeded to interject evidence at the 
trial regarding that issue, rather than relying exclusively 
on their Proffer of Proof. On behalf of Plaintiff, objections 
were made not once but several times to the effect that such 
evidence was precluded by the prior summary judgments. None-
theless the trial court allowed the evidence in. (R. 244 
through 255). How then, having forced this material into the 
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record over objections of Plaintiff's counsel, 
can Defendant 
logically complain when the trial courts 
make a finding on 
the subject. 
Finally, even the Proffer of Proof itself is un. 
availing and somewhat diseased from an evidentiary point of 
view. With respect to the testimony proffered from Messrs. 
Zeldman and Wellbeloved (coitUUencing at p. 2 of the Proffer), 
many of the materials are speculative and would be inadmissit 
as a matter of evidence. See for example, paragraph 6 at p. 
4 of the Proffer wherein it is stated: 
"Mr. Wellbeloved cannot recall 
specifically requesting Mr. Lowe 
to submit such proof, but assumes 
that Mr. Lowe knew that such proof 
was required." 
Quite obviously, such testimony would not be admissible. Nor 
does the Proffer contain any evidence with respect to Sherato: 
attitude about issuing a franchise to a company which did not 
have the financial ability to buy the property in question. 
One could quite logically assume that if Sheraton does indeed 
require evidence of control of the property, as indicated in 
the Proffer (paragraph 3), that they would not issue a fran-
chise to a company which had not a deed or contract to purcha: 
the property and the financial ability to do so - a condition 
precedent which Development Services did not meet. 
The remainder of the Proffer purports to introduce 
parole evidence which, if introduced at all, should have been 
introduced at the time of Judge Croft's summary judgment, not 
almost a year later. 
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CONCLUSION 
When all is said and done, the case boils down 
to a relatively simple contract case. The contract expressly 
provides that if a Sheraton Franchise is not obtained on or 
before June 1, 1974, that the purchaser has "the right" to 
a refund of all sums paid less interest on the total purchase 
price for the period in question. A Sheraton Franchise was 
not obtained on the due date, a fact not disputed, and Plain-
tiff properly seeks recovery of its funds paid less interest 
amounting to some $21,000.00. The case, in one form or another, 
has received the scrutiny of several District Court Judges 
all of whom have consistently held that Plaintiff did not 
violate the contract, that it was not in default of the con-
tract, and that it properly sought to enforce its express 
rights under the contract. 
The trial court should be affirmed. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
An.CV-J ~ CU-Lj-
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
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